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Abstract
Coalition parties have to reconcile two competing logics: They need to demonstrate
unity to govern together, but also have to emphasize their own profile to succeed in
elections. We argue that the electoral cycle explains whether unity or differentiation
prevails. While differentiation dominates at the beginning and the end of the legislative
term in close proximity to elections, compromise dominates the middle of the term
when coalition governments focus on enacting a common policy agenda. To test our
theoretical claims, we draw on an innovative quantitative text analysis of more than
21,000 press releases published by coalition parties from 2000 until 2010.
Keywords: Coalition Governments, Electoral Cycle, Political Parties, Political
Communication, Press Releases, Quantitative Text Analysis
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1 Introduction
Coalition governments pose a dilemma for political parties.1 Entering a coalition government
allows political parties to obtain control over political offices and to enact policies.
However, unlike political parties in single-party governments which can independently decide
legislation, political parties in coalition governments are constrained by their coalition
partner. Coalition governments are composed of two or more political parties which pursue
their own policy goals and issue priorities. In order to ensure the stability of the cabinet
and to effectively govern together, coalition parties need to coordinate their efforts. Even
though coalition parties typically have different policy goals, governing together and adopting
joint policy initiatives therefore requires compromise. However, at the same time, coalition
parties are also subject to electoral competition. In order to successfully compete in elections,
coalition parties need to differentiate from their partners to strengthen their own policy
profile. Thus, while coalition parties govern together, they compete for votes alone. As a result,
coalition parties have to reconcile two realities. On the one hand, they need to demonstrate
unity, but at the same time, they have to maintain and emphasize their own profile.
In this study, we argue that political communication is an important instrument through
which coalition parties can accommodate both imperatives. Governing in coalitions often
involves compromise as coalition partners have different policy goals. Coalition parties
therefore frequently adopt legislation that accommodate the demands of their partners, but
which are not necessarily in line with what voters expect from them. It is therefore important
that coalition parties communicate directly with their voters in order to justify their legislative
activities and to differentiate themselves from their coalition partner. Political communication
constitutes an important channel through which coalition partners can directly communicate
their policy priorities to their voters without being constrained by parliamentary rules or
their coalition partner (Grimmer, 2013). Coalition parties choose independently what to
communicate and when to communicate it which makes political communication an important
instrument of party competition.
1The authors’ names follow the principle of rotation. Both authors have contributed equally to all work.
We thank James Adams, Hanna Ba¨ck, Nicholas Charron, William Heller, Thomas Saalfeld, the anonymous
reviewers and Ken Benoit for valuable comments and suggestions.
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The literature on coalition governments has devoted little attention to political
communication. Rather than focusing on the day-to-day politics when the real business of
government takes place, the coalition literature has largely focused on the formation and
the dissolution of cabinets. One can distinguish three broad strands of research: studies
investigating the formation, the survival and the governance of coalition governments. First,
coalition scholars have devoted considerable attention to explaining which parties are likely
to form coalitions and to predicting the allocation of ministerial portfolios and policy benefits
among them (see e.g. Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Ba¨ck, Debus and Dumont, 2011; Schermann
and Ennser-Jedenastik, forthcoming). Second, with regard to cabinet dissolution, previous
research has examined the determinants of cabinet duration and coalition survival (see
e.g. Warwick, 1994; Lupia and Strøm, 1995; Saalfeld, 2008). Third, scholars of coalition
governance are concerned with the control mechanisms that make it possible for coalition
partners to overcome agency problems created by the delegation to cabinet ministers (see e.g.
Thies, 2001; Mu¨ller, 2008; Mu¨ller and Meyer, 2010; Martin and Vanberg, 2011; Falco´-Gimeno,
2014).
While the formation, the governance and the dissolution of coalition governments have
received extensive scholarly attention, there are only very few studies that examine the
policy activities of coalition governments throughout the legislative term. Martin (2004)
showed that both, salience and divisiveness account for the timing of legislative bills in
coalition governments. Issues that are attractive to all coalition members are prioritized
while divisive issues are postponed. Studying the compliance with semi-annual legislative
programmes, Zubek and Klu¨ver (forthcoming) similarly find that legislative bills are more
quickly approved by coalition governments if they are salient to coalition parties and if there
is no disagreement about these issues. Thomson (2001) however finds that pledge fulfilment is
less likely if coalition parties disagree about a pledge while salience does not have an effect on
its enactment. A recent study of three Austrian coalition governments furthermore shows that
institutional determinants significantly influence the fulfilment of electoral pledges while party
preferences and issue salience do not have an impact on whether and when a pledge is enacted
(Ennser-Jedenastik and Schermann, 2013; Schermann and Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014).
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While analyzing the timing of legislative bills and the conditions under which electoral pledges
are fulfilled considerably enhances our understanding of the legislative activities of coalition
governments, little attention has been paid to how coalition governments communicate with
their voters throughout the legislative term. Martin and Vanberg (2008) analyze how coalition
parties use legislative speeches to communicate with voters. Taking the length of legislative
speeches as an indicator for the position of political parties on the debated issue, they find
that coalition parties use legislative speeches as a device to justify their policy compromise on
divisive issues in the light of upcoming elections. However, while Martin and Vanberg (2008)
make an important contribution to understanding the parliamentary behavior of coalition
parties, speeches are constrained by procedural parliamentary rules and are therefore a
problematic data source for measuring political communication. Political parties can only
give speeches on policy issues that have been scheduled on the parliamentary agenda. What
is more, due to the extensive array of parliamentary control instruments that are available
to opposition parties in many parliamentary systems (Saalfeld, 2000), coalition governments
primarily have to respond to opposition parties.
This study therefore aims to close this important gap in the literature by studying the
determinants of political communication strategies of coalition parties on the basis of press
releases which constitute an ideal data source to analyze what coalition parties communicate
to their voters. We argue that coalition parties have to respond to different logics: On the
one hand, they need to demonstrate unity in order to maintain and strengthen the coalition
to effectively govern together. On the other hand, coalition parties need to emphasize their
own profile in order to attract voters. We posit that the electoral cycle determines which
imperative dominates political communication of coalition parties. Based on a quantitative
text analysis of more than 21,000 press releases published by coalition parties in Germany
between 2000 and 2010, we empirically test our theoretical expectations and show that while
differentiation prevails at the beginning and the end of the legislative term in close proximity
to elections, compromise dominates the middle of the term when coalition governments focus
on enacting a common policy agenda.
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2 Issue attention of coalition parties
Drawing on saliency theory, we expect that parties compete with each other by selectively
highlighting policy issues to mobilize voters. Building on insights from coalition theory, we
argue that coalition governments constrain such party competition as governing in a coalition
requires compromise in order not to risk breaking the government. Coalition parties therefore
have to reconcile the tension between maintaining their own profile and demonstrating unity
with their coalition partner. We hypothesize that the stage of the electoral cycle determines
whether differentiation or unity prevails.
Before we theorize about the determinants of political communication, it is important to
understand the underlying motivation of coalition party behavior. We assume that parties are
rational, goal-oriented and purposeful collective actors that aim to maximize the achievement
of their preferences. Following Riker (1962), we consider parties as office-seeking actors.
Parties seek to win elections for instrumental reasons as they are primarily interested in
political offices. Political parties aim at winning elections in order to gain control over
executive posts. We hereby make no assumptions about the underlying motivation for
office-seeking behavior of political parties. Political offices might be valued for intrinsic or
instrumental reasons (Strøm, 1990).
2.1 The electoral imperative
What strategy do political parties pursue in order to obtain control over political offices?
Theories of party competition have largely been dominated by positional theories such as
the Downsian proximity model (Downs, 1957) or the directional model (Rabinowitz and
Macdonald, 1989). These theories suggest that parties seek to maximize the number of votes
by adjusting their policy positions in response to the preference configuration of voters
on certain policy issues. Changing policy positions may, however, be difficult as parties
are constrained by their ideology, their reputation and intra-party factors (Meyer, 2013).
Agenda-setting scholars by contrast argue that political parties compete with each other
by campaigning on different policy issues (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; Green-Pedersen
and Mortensen, 2014). The literature on communication refers to this strategy as “priming”
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certain issues in order to change the importance given to policy issues in political decisions
(Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). Similarly, Riker (1993) argues that campaign messages are not
designed to engage in a discussion with opposition parties, but to increase the salience of
policy issues on which a party is perceived as credible.
Saliency theory applies this thought explicitly to party competition (Budge and Farlie, 1983;
Budge, 1993). The central idea is that parties compete with each other by emphasizing
different policy priorities rather than by directly opposing each other on the same issues.
Saliency theory argues that parties can gain advantages by selectively highlighting favorable
issues irrespective of what position they have on these issues. Political parties prime voters to
consider policy issues as important for their vote choice on which they have an advantage. We
accordingly argue that winning elections is primarily about selectively highlighting political
issues on which political parties can mobilize voters. Political parties seek to influence the
campaign agenda by highlighting policy issues that promote their strengths and by avoiding
policy issues on which their competitors have an advantage. We therefore expect that political
parties engage in selective issue emphasis to increase the salience of favorable policy issues.
For instance, a left-wing party may choose to focus on social welfare issues in an election
campaign whereas a liberal party may choose to focus on the economy or on civil rights.
2.2 The coalition imperative
However, while political parties can independently choose their issue priorities in election
campaigns, they are constrained in their selective issue emphasis once they enter a coalition
government. Unlike in single party governments where political parties can independently
make decisions, coalition governments require coordination and compromise among coalition
parties. Jones and Baumgartner (2005) have referred to this coordination requirement as
institutional friction caused by proportional electoral systems. Governments in these political
systems cannot single-handedly promote policy change, but are constrained by multiparty
governing coalitions. In many parliamentary systems in particular those with proportional
representation, none of the political parties is able to win a majority of the seats in the
legislature. In such situations, coalition governments consisting of at least two different
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parties have typically been formed to avoid the transaction costs, the uncertainty and the
instability of minority governments. Political parties that join a coalition government sacrifice
their independence for the sake of controlling political office. Coalition governments are not
intrinsically valued, but they constitute a means for office-seeking parties to obtain ministry
portfolios.
Research on coalition governance has pointed at the difficulties of governing together in
coalition cabinets. Coalition parties typically have diverging policy preferences and issue
priorities that need to be reconciled. For instance, when the coalition government between
the German CDU/CSU and the FDP was formed in 2009, the FDP first called for a grand
tax reform which was its major policy priority that it advocated for throughout the election
campaign. However, the CDU/CSU fundamentally opposed such a large scale reform of the
German tax system and it was therefore never enacted. After initially pushing for the reform
and differentiating from the CDU/CSU on this policy issue, the FDP later gave in for the sake
of maintaining the government even though it implied considerable reputation and electoral
costs. Thus, coalition parties cannot independently promote their own policy priorities,
but they have to agree on a common agenda. In order to overcome policy disagreements
within a cabinet, coalition parties frequently employ control mechanisms such as coalition
agreements, junior ministers or parliamentary committees to keep their coalition partners in
line (Thies, 2001; Mu¨ller and Strøm, 2008; Mu¨ller and Meyer, 2010; Martin and Vanberg,
2011). Accordingly, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argue that issue attention cannot be
understood by only focusing on one single stage of decision-making as policy-making consists
of different stages. If policy issues do not rise on the agenda of a coalition party it may not
be caused by the party’s unwillingness to deal with the issue, but by opposition from the
coalition partner during the government formation stage in which coalition parties negotiated
their common policy priorities.
Hence, an important precondition for the functioning and the survival of a coalition
government is unity (Martin and Vanberg, 2008, 2011). Successful governance requires
compromise. Once political parties entered a coalition government they have to coordinate
their activities with their coalition partner. Parties are not able to single-handedly make
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political decisions, but they need to consult their coalition partner in order not to risk the
break of the government (Warwick, 1994; Lupia and Strøm, 1995). The benefits of cooperation
are greater than the benefits of differentiation as government stability ensures control over
political offices. Office-seeking parties therefore have an incentive to maintain the coalition in
order to avoid the loss of executive posts. Instead of focusing on their own policy priorities,
coalition parties therefore deal with issues that are supported by all coalition members in
order to demonstrate unity and to maintain the stability of the cabinet.
2.3 The electoral cycle
Coalition parties are therefore torn between two different imperatives. On the one hand,
they have to selectively prioritize policy issues on which they have an advantage in order
to mobilize voters. On the other hand, they have to coordinate with their coalition partners
that typically have diverging policy priorities which requires compromise between coalition
parties. How can we explain which of these forces prevails? Our central argument is that the
stage of the electoral cycle explains whether differentiation or unity prevails. The time the
government has available until the next election is a major factor that shapes the behavior
of coalition parties as the cost-benefit calculation considerably changes over the life-time of
a coalition (Lupia and Strøm, 1995).
At the beginning of the legislative term, political parties have just come out of an electoral
race in which they have competed against each other for votes. Political parties have run
a carefully designed election campaign in which they selectively focused on policy issues on
which they have an advantage to mobilize voters. We expect that the issue differentiation
between political parties which characterized the election campaign continues for a while
even after the election took place for the following reasons. First, political parties cannot
change their policy activities from one day to the next. After campaigning on specific policy
issues for several months, they cannot simply abandon these issues as this would considerably
disappoint voters and decrease their credibility. Second, political parties make several election
promises to voters during the electoral campaign. After the election, coalition parties have an
incentive to signal compliance with their commitments to voters by enacting their election
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promises right at the beginning of the term as media attention and public monitoring is
still high at this stage. Accordingly, empirical research on pledge fulfillment finds a cyclical
effect according to which coalition parties enact their pledges primarily at the beginning of
the term (Ennser-Jedenastik and Schermann, 2013; Zubek and Klu¨ver, forthcoming). Third,
after running in elections alone, political parties have to get used to governing together with
a partner. There is therefore a learning effect as coalition parties have to adapt to the new
situation in which they have to coordinate their activities with at least one other party.
Hence, we argue that the beginning of the legislative term is characterized by considerable
differentiation between coalition parties.
However, after an initial period of focusing on different issues which might have caused
problems and conflicts within the cabinet, coalition parties settle on a common issue agenda
to effectively govern together and ensure the stability of the government. Coalition parties
avoid disagreement in order to strengthen and maintain the coalition to secure the political
offices they control. The survival of the government is a precondition for maintaining their
political offices and office-seeking coalition parties therefore have strong incentives to avoid
any activities that risk the break of the government. Control mechanisms are in place which
allow coalition partners to closely monitor their partners and keep them on track (Thies,
2001; Mu¨ller, 2008; Mu¨ller and Meyer, 2010; Martin and Vanberg, 2011; Falco´-Gimeno, 2014).
Coalition parties therefore prioritize policy issues that are supported by all members of the
coalition while avoiding issues on which they disagree. Since the benefits of cooperation
outweigh its costs, coalition parties focus on a common issue agenda. Thus, in order to
maintain the stability of the coalition, all partners talk about the same uncontroversial issues
in the middle of the term when they enact a common legislative agenda.
A the end of the legislative term, coalition parties look ahead and are primarily concerned
about reelection to secure political offices in the next legislative term (Lupia and Strøm,
1995). The imperative to demonstrate unity will be replaced by an imperative to gain
reelection. Given that coalition parties suffer from the problem that differences between
them are not perceived by voters (Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013), coalition parties adjust
their issue priorities to clearly differentiate from their partners. Rather than talking about
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the same unifying issues, they differentiate from their partners to highlight their own policy
profile. Coalition parties therefore abandon policy issues on which they previously worked
together and focus on favorable policy issues that separate them from other competitors.
They attempt to mobilize voters by directing the public debate towards policy issues on which
they are perceived as being more competent than their opponents. The costs of cooperation
become larger than its benefits as there are only a few months left in the current government
and coalition parties would risk their reelection by not differentiating themselves from their
coalition partner (Lupia and Strøm, 1995). For instance, Wolfgang Kubicki, one of the FDP
leaders commented a few days after the Bundestag election in 2013 when the FDP was voted
out of the parliament that “coalition parties only win elections if they differentiate from
their coalition partner” and that “the FDP should not have collaborated so much with the
coalition partner”.2 What is more, coalition parties can more easily promote their own issue
priorities as their partners are less likely to use control mechanisms towards the end of the
electoral cycle (Mu¨ller and Meyer, 2010).
In conclusion, we expect that the political communication strategies of coalition parties
change over the course of the electoral cycle. In order to win elections, political parties
selectively highlight policy issues on which they have an electoral advantage. However, when
parties entered a coalition government, they cannot independently select their issue focus, but
they have to coordinate with their coalition partner. In order to effectively govern together
and not to risk the break of the government, coalition parties need to compromise and
agree on a common agenda. However, such coordination is costly as coalition parties cannot
highlight their particular policy profile to attract voters. Coalition parties therefore have to
reconcile the tension between maintaining their own profile and demonstrating unity with
their coalition partner. We expect that the stage of the electoral cycle determines what
coalition parties communicate to their voters. More specifically, we hypothesize that diversity
in issue attention among coalition partners follows a u-shaped form. While differentiation
prevails at the beginning and the end of the legislative term in close proximity to elections,
compromise dominates the middle of the term when coalition governments focus on enacting
2Source: http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/wolfgang-kubicki-im-stern-wir-waren-am-rande-der-
selbstachtung-2060219.html
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a common policy agenda.
Hypothesis:
As distance from the last national election increases, the diversity in issue attention among
coalition parties decreases; however, as distance to the next national election decreases,
diversity in issue attention among coalition parties increases again.
3 Research design
3.1 Coalition governments in Germany
In order to test our theoretical claims, we study political communication strategies of
coalition parties in Germany for three different reasons. First, Germany is typically governed
by multiparty coalition governments. In the post-war period, Germany was only governed
once by a single party government from July 1960 until November 1961. Political parties
in Germany therefore have a long-standing experience with coalition governments and are
well-aware of their electoral implications which they have to bear in mind for strategically
positioning themselves. Second, Germany is characterized by a high degree of government
stability. In Germany’s over 60 year history, only four elections were called early out of which
one was caused by German reunification. Party competition therefore takes place in a stable
environment where the electoral cycle is hardly interrupted. Political parties therefore take
into account the timing of elections in their strategic considerations. Finally, as we outline in
more detail below, we use daily press releases published by coalition parties to analyze their
political communication strategies. Since press releases of all Bundestag parties are publicly
available on their websites or in archives of political foundations, Germany is also an ideal
case due to data availability.
3.2 Measuring issue attention
In order to analyze political communication strategies of coalition parties, we rely on the press
releases published by their party group press offices in the German Bundestag. Press releases
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are an ideal source for the study of party communication (see also Grimmer, 2010, 2013).
They are published daily so that we can study issue attention on a day-to-day basis which
makes press releases superior to election manifestos and expert surveys. In addition, they are
published by each coalition party so that we can measure issue attention separately for each
member of a coalition which constitutes a major advantage over legislative activity data. Press
releases are furthermore unconstrained as parties can freely choose what to communicate to
the public. Unlike speeches or questions in Parliament, press releases are not bound by the
parliamentary agenda and parties can choose independently what issues they want to talk
about. Press releases are furthermore an ideal instrument to present themselves to their
constituents. Newspapers regularly pick up press releases issued by political parties and
communicate their content to citizens (Schaffner, 2006).
We study communication strategies of coalition parties in Germany from 2000 until 2010.
This time frame allows us to examine the dynamics of issue attention across four legislative
terms and four cabinets with three different partisan compositions. Following 16 years of
government by the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), its Bavarian sister party (CSU) and
the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Social Democrats lead by Chancellor Gerhard Schro¨der
formed a coalition government with Alliance 90/The Greens (Greens) in October 1998.3
The next regular election in 2002 confirmed this government and it was only in 2005 when
Chancellor Schro¨der called for early elections by deliberately loosing a vote of confidence
that the composition of the coalition government changed. From November 2005, a so-called
“Grand Coalition” composed of the CDU/CSU and the SPD governed Germany which was
lead by Angela Merkel (CDU). The next regular election in September 2009 lead to another
change in the composition of the German government as the CDU/CSU coalesced with the
liberal FDP. Hence, our sample includes very different government types. Table A.1 in the
online appendix provides information about the changes in cabinet composition from 2000
until 2010.
Every political party in the Bundestag has a press office that is responsible for the publication
3It has to be noted that preelectoral coalitions as defined by Golder (2006a) only exist with regard to
the CDU/CSU which form one single party group in the Bundestag, but they are actually separate parties.
The CDU and CSU share a similar ideological orientation and coordinate their activities as the CSU only
competes in Bavaria while the CDU covers the remaining 15 states.
11
of press releases of their party groups. We gathered all the press releases published by coalition
parties between January 2000 and December 2010. All press releases were electronically
available. Since all press releases by the SPD and the CDU/CSU were published on their party
group websites, a computer script was used to automatically download all press releases. As
the press releases of the Greens and the FDP were not available online, we contacted their
Bundestag press offices which provided us with all press releases published between 2000 and
2010. According to party officials, our dataset contains all press releases published in the years
2000 until 2010 so that there is no selection bias. Table A.2 in the appendix shows the total
number of press releases published between 2000 to 2010 while table A.5 provides information
about their average length.4 On average, each party published about 1,126 press releases per
year which corresponds to approximately three press releases per day. Press releases therefore
provide a detailed account of the daily issue attention of political parties.
It is important to note the distinction between the full universe of press releases published by
the four main party groups (N=44,957) and those published by coalition parties (N=22,092).
As we first use the press releases to identify the political issues on which German parties
compete, we analyzed all the available press releases to make sure that we capture the
entire universe of policy issues that structure party competition in Germany and not only
government-specific issues. However, in order to measure political communication strategies
by coalition parties, we then limit the analysis to the attention that government parties pay
to the identified issue areas and therefore only analyze press releases published by coalition
parties. It furthermore has to be noted that the CDU/CSU press releases for the year 2000
could not be provided by the party group and could therefore not be included in the dataset.
However, they only represent less than 5% of the entire sample of press releases and since
the CDU/CSU was not in government in 2000, we are therefore confident that the missing
press releases do not bias our results.
We classify press releases into issue areas using a quantitative text analysis technique
4We did not include the press releases published by the socialist party for two reasons: First, the then-called
PDS did not pass the five percent threshold and only gained two direct mandates in the 2002 election. As a
result, it did not constitute a party group in the Bundestag. Second, in the 2000 to 2010 period, the socialist
party underwent considerable changes. In 2005, it formed an electoral alliance with members of the newly
founded WASG running on PDS lists before both parties merged in 2007 and formed the new socialist party
“Die LINKE”.
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developed by Grimmer (2010) that applies a bayesian hierarchical topic model to textual data.
This so-called expressed agenda model is an unsupervised learning method that classifies
texts into distinct categories based on the co-occurrence of words across documents. The
underlying assumption of the expressed agenda model is the well-established idea that topics
are expressed with a distinctive set of words. Words that belong to one single issue are
mentioned together more often than words that belong to two separate issues. For instance,
a press release about environmental protection has a high probability to contain words such as
“environment”, “nature” or “conservation” whereas a statement about unemployment policy
has a high probability to include words such as “jobs”, “unemployed” or “work”.
The expressed agenda model is particularly well-suited for automatically classifying press
releases into issue areas for two different reasons. First, the hierarchical structure of the model
very much resembles our text corpus structure as the press releases in our dataset are issued
by four different political parties which devote attention to a common set of issues. Second,
the expressed agenda model is mono-thematic as every document is only classified into one
single issue area. Unlike other political texts drafted by political parties such as manifestos
or speeches which typically cover several topics, press releases are short statements devoted
to one single issue (see the press release examples in the appendix).
In order to apply the topic model to our text corpus, a number of standard preparatory
steps (e.g. stopword removal and stemming) are required that are outlined in the appendix
(see e.g. Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). In order to estimate the model, the researcher has to
provide information about the authorship of the press releases (here: which party published
the statement) and the number of issue areas in which the press statements should be
classified. We decided to classify the press releases into 20 policy issues for substantive and
methodological reasons. We hereby followed a procedure that has been established in previous
document classification studies (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). At the first stage, we estimated
the expressed agenda model varying the number of issues from 15 to 35. At the second stage,
we relied on human judgement to select the final model by assessing the quality of the
identified thematic clusters.
To ensure the validity of the classification, we followed the recommendations by Grimmer
13
and Stewart (2013) and relied on three different validation strategies (for details, see the
online appendix). First, we evaluated whether the press releases that were grouped into one
thematic category are internally consistent by analyzing the key terms which the expressed
agenda model identified for assigning the texts to the different issue areas. Second, since the
German Bundestag is a parliament with strong committees, we checked whether the issue
areas identified by the text analysis resemble the portfolios of Bundestag committees. Third,
we obtained a stratified sample from the text corpus that included ten press statements per
thematic category. We then relied on human coding to assign the press releases into the twenty
thematic categories. Given that all three checks corrobated the classification results, we are
confident that the topic model arrived at a reasonable classification of the text analysis.
Based on the results of the text analysis, we measure the dependent variable as follows: We
first estimate the attention that coalition parties pay to the 20 identified issue areas by the
share of the press releases published within one month that were devoted to each policy issue.
We then measure the diversity in issue attention among the two coalition parties by estimating
the issue-specific difference in the attention that both coalitions parties pay to the 20 policy
issues. More specifically, we estimated the distance between the attention that is paid by
both coalition parties to a given policy issue in a given month (|PartnerA− PartnerB|).5
instance, imagine the SPD has published 100 press releases in January 2000 out of which
20 are devoted to the economy while its coalition partner, the Greens, have published 5 out
of 100 press releases that deal with the economy in the same month. The diversity in the
issue area “economy” of the Red-Green government in January 2000 would be calculated as
follows: |SPD −Greens| = |0.20− 0.05| = 0.15. Given that this measure is highly skewed
to the right, we used the logged absolute distance as the dependent variable.
5We decided to use this issue-specific diversity measure and not an overall diversity measure aggregated
across all 20 issue areas since the issue-specific measure allows us to link to public opinion data as we discuss
in the following section since one might expect that differentiation decreases in issue areas that are generally
very salient to voters. We however also tested the robustness of our findings using the overall diversity across
all issue areas by estimating the Taxicab distance between the two coalition parties over time. The results
remain substantially the same as in the model we report in the results section.
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3.3 Measuring independent variables
In order to empirically test whether political communication strategies of coalition parties
systematically vary over the course of the legislative term, we measure the stage of the
electoral cycle by the number of months until the next national election. In addition, we
also include the squared number of remaining months to capture the hypothesized U-shaped
effect of the electoral cycle on issue diversity.
We include additional controls to isolate the effect of the national electoral cycle on issue
diversity. First, we take into account the impact of state-level elections by including a dummy
variable indicating whether an election takes places in one of the 16 La¨nder during the same
month. Second, we control for the effect of European Parliament (EP) elections on political
communication strategies of coalition parties by including a dummy variable capturing
whether an EP occurred during the same month. We control for state and EP elections
as one might expect greater differentiation during election campaigns at the subnational or
European level.
Third, in order to control for the responsiveness of coalition parties to public opinion, we
controlled for voter issue attention as previous studies have shown that political parties
respond to the issue priorities of voters (Klu¨ver and Spoon, forthcoming; Spoon and Klu¨ver,
2014). As a result, we expect that coalition parties differentiate less on issues that are highly
salient among citizens. We obtained data on the most important policy issues from the
Politbarometer which is a representative survey that is carried out monthly among German
citizens. We matched the most important issues indicated by respondents with the 20 issue
areas identified by the text analysis and used the percentage of respondents indicating each
issue area as important as a measure for voter issue attention. Fourth, in order to control
for the state of the economy we include the unemployment rate in our regression model.
Since economic performance is an important predictor of citizens’ vote choice (Lewis-Beck
and Stegmaier, 2000), we expect that coalition parties differentiate less if the unemployment
rate is high since all governmental parties prioritize this issue in times of economic downturn.
Finally, we control for important focusing events that might have caused shifts in political
communication strategies of coalition parties throughout the legislative cycle (Walgrave,
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Varone and Dumont, 2006), namely the BSE (mad cow disease) crisis, the CDU funding
scandal, the 9/11 terror attacks, the war in Afghanistan, the devastating German flood in
2002, the 2006 football world cup in Germany and the current economic crisis.6 We expect
that coalition parties differentiate less if a focusing event occurs since all coalition parties are
equally affected by these external shocks.
4 Data analysis
In order to illustrate how issue diversity in coalition governments varies over the course of
the legislative term, figure 1 plots the diversity in attention from 2000 until 2010 for two
selected policy issues, economy and the environment and nuclear safety. Higher values signal
diversity in issue attention while smaller values indicate that both coalition parties pay similar
attention to the same policy issues. The legislative terms are separated by vertical dashed
lines which indicate the federal elections. Figure 1 indicates that issue diversity considerably
varies over the course of the electoral cycle. Despite some deviations from the overall trend,
figure 1 shows that differentiation prevails at the beginning and the end of the legislative
term while coalition parties tend to talk about similar issues in the middle of the electoral
cycle. However, during the first Merkel government (CDU/CSU and SPD), we additionally
observe major peaks in issue differentiation during the middle of the electoral cycle which
might have been caused by the emergence of the economic crisis and a focus of the SPD on
the nuclear phase-out which it launched during the preceding legislative term. Hence, despite
some deviations from the predicted U-shaped pattern, figure 1 by and large corroborates our
theoretical expectations.
In order to test the effect of the electoral cycle while controling for potential confounding
variables, we estimate a multivariate regression model. Our dataset consists of monthly data
on issue attention of coalition parties to 20 different policy issues from 2000 until 2010. The
dataset is therefore simultaneously characterized by a cross-sectional as well as a time-series
6We also estimated a model with a more comprehensive list of focusing events obtained from the Europa
World Year Book. However, given that the results do not change we decided to rely on the more parsimonious
list of events. Given that media coverage is importantly affected by the newsworthiness of events (Shoemaker
and Reese, 2013; Golding and Elliott, 1979), including these focusing events also allow us to capture important
spikes in media attention.
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Figure 1: Diversity in issue attention over time
(a) Economy (b) Environment
component. To estimate a model with such a structure requires specific attention to both
differences between policy issues and time-series dependencies. Due to the cross-sectional
nature of the dataset, it is likely that the error terms have a different variance from one
policy issue to the next (heteroskedastic errors) and also that they are correlated across issues
(serial correlation). In order to address these problems, we follow the approach suggested by
Beck and Katz (1995) and estimate a regression model with panel-corrected standard errors.
In order to account for potential autocorrelation, we include the lagged dependent variable
(Beck and Katz, 1995, 1996). As diversity in attention levels might vary considerably across
issue areas since coalition parties might consider some issues to be more important than
others, we additionally include fixed effects for issue areas. We checked the robustness of
our findings by estimating a beta regression on the basis of the untransformed dependent
variable as a robustness check (see table A.7 in the appendix). The results are substantially
the same.
Table 1 presents the results of the time-series cross-section regression analysis. Column 1
reports the results of the basic model while model 2 includes additional fixed effects for
coalition government types. Across both model specifications, we find statistically significant
effects for the electoral cycle. The number of months until the next national election has
a statistically significant negative effect while the squared number of months until the
next election has a statistically significant positive effect on the diversity in the attention
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Table 1: Time-series cross-section regression analysis
DV: Issue attention diversity (t0) Model 1 Model 2
Explanatory variables
Number of months until next national election -0.026** -0.022**
(0.010) (0.010)
Number of months until next national election (squared) 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Control variables
EP election 0.184 0.187
(0.242) (0.243)
State election -0.104 -0.118
(0.079) (0.079)
Voter issue attention 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
Unemployment -0.128*** -0.103***
(0.032) (0.035)
BSE crisis -0.101 -0.099
(0.206) (0.205)
CDU funding scandal -0.002 0.139
(0.141) (0.148)
9/11 Terror attacks 0.276 0.332
(0.250) (0.250)
Afghanistan war -0.292 -0.312
(0.268) (0.266)
Flood -0.061 0.101
(0.331) (0.339)
Worldcup -0.003 -0.146
(0.234) (0.237)
Economic crisis -0.336*** -0.225
(0.114) (0.148)
CDU/CSU-SPD coalition 0.181*
(0.093)
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition -0.104
(0.206)
Issue attention diversity (t−1) 0.035 0.029
(0.024) (0.024)
Constant -2.163*** -2.623***
(0.425) (0.460)
N 2,300 2,300
R2 0.09 0.10
***p ≤ 0.01,**p ≤ 0.05,*p ≤ 0.10; Standard errors in parentheses; Issue area
fixed effects not reported
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that coalition parties pay to policy issues. The time-series cross-section regression analysis
therefore provides empirical support for our theoretical expectations. Diversity in issue
attention follows a U-shaped form over the course of the electoral cycle. While differentiation
is high at the beginning and the end of the electoral cycle in proximity to national elections,
differentiation is low in the middle of the legislative term when coalition parties pursue a
common policy agenda.7
In order to illustrate the effect of the electoral cycle on the diversity in issue attention among
coalition parties, we simulated predicted values as suggested by King, Tomz and Wittenberg
(2000). Figure 2 displays the simulated predicted diversity in issue attention among coalition
partners as the number of months until the next elections vary while holding all other variables
constant. Figure 2 confirms the expected U-shaped relationship between the electoral cycle
and the diversity in issue attention among coalition parties. At the beginning of the term, issue
diversity is relatively high indicating that coalition parties highlight different political issues.
Issue diversity then steadily decreases and reaches its minimum in the middle of the legislative
term. In the light of the next upcoming national election, coalition parties differentiate from
each other by talking about different issues towards the end of the legislative term. Hence,
while coalition parties demonstrate unity in the middle of the term, they differentiate from
their coalition partners at the beginning and the end of the electoral cycle. While figure 2
shows that diversity on average changes by roughly two press releases (0.02) over the electoral
cycle, the size of this effect should not be underestimated. Given that the average number of
press releases published by a party in a month is 80 with roughly four press releases per issue,
a difference of two to four press releases can imply a significant degree of change as it means
that a party can duplicate the amount of press releases devoted to a particular issue.
With regard to the control variables, the regression analysis shows that only the
unemployment rate has a statistically significant effect on issue diversity across both model
specifications. The larger the unemployment rate, the smaller the differences in issue emphasis
among coalition parties. As unemployment is typically the most important policy issue for
German citizens as public opinion surveys indicate, it is hardly surprising that coalition
7These results are consistent when we control for the level of issue-specific policy conflict measured on
the basis of the Comparative Manifesto Project data (Volkens, Judith Bara and Klingemann, 2013) for the
middle of the electoral cycle. Results can be found in table A.4 in the appendix.
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Figure 2: Effect of the electoral cycle on diversity in issue attention
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The figure is computed based on model 1 reported in table 1
parties spend a similar amount of time and effort on this issue if unemployment levels are high.
Model 1 moreover shows that the economic crisis leads to smaller differences in issue emphasis
between coalition parties. Given the extensive scope and the important consequences of the
crisis for the German and European economy, it is also a very intuitive finding that coalition
parties join their forces to fight the economic crisis. The empirical analysis furthermore
suggests that issue diversity is considerably larger in the grand coalition while the effect of
the electoral cycle however holds. The time-series cross-section regression analysis moreover
demonstrates that none of the other control variables has a systematic effect on diversity in
issue attention.
5 Conclusion
Coalition parties need to reconcile the tension between two imperatives. On the one hand,
they need to demonstrate unity with their coalition partner in order to effectively govern
together and to maintain the stability of the cabinet. On the other hand, they need to
highlight their own policy profile in order to attract voters. We posited that political
communication constitutes an important instrument through which coalition parties can
accommodate both imperatives. In order to shed light on how political communication in
20
coalition governments works, we have analyzed more than 21,000 press releases published by
coalition parties in the German Bundestag from 2000 until 2010 drawing on quantitative text
analysis. We have demonstrated that issue attention among coalition parties changes over
the course of the electoral cycle. While differentiation prevails at the beginning and the end
of the legislative term in close proximity to elections, compromise dominates the middle of
the term when coalition governments focus on enacting a common policy agenda.
Our findings have important implications for our understanding of coalition governance. It
has largely been argued in the coalition literature that once coalition governments have been
formed, coalition parties prioritize unity and cohesion in order to effectively pursue their
legislative agenda. Even though coalition parties often have diverging preferences, research
on coalition governance has demonstrated that coalition parties use control mechanisms such
as coalition agreements, junior ministers or parliamentary committees to keep their coalition
partners on track (Thies, 2001; Mu¨ller and Strøm, 2008; Mu¨ller and Meyer, 2010; Martin
and Vanberg, 2011; Falco´-Gimeno, 2014). However, as this study has demonstrated, the
day-to-day politics of coalition governments are not only about signaling unity, but also
about differentiation. Coalition governance is a mixed-motive game in which coalition parties
have to reconcile the tension between policy compromise to maintain government stability
and policy differentiation to ensure electoral success. While cooperation prevails in the middle
of the legislative term when coalition governments focus on enacting a common legislative
agenda, differentiation dominates at the beginning and the end of the electoral cycle. Coalition
governance is therefore not as unified as commonly suggested, but coalition parties clearly
spell out their policy differences.
Our study has furthermore demonstrated the importance of political communication
strategies. Governing in coalitions often requires compromise between coalition parties. Due
to the constraints set by governing with at least one other partner, political parties are
often not able to enact the policies they promised to their voters. Rather than letting only
the legislative record speak for itself, we have shown that political communication is an
important instrument through which coalition parties can directly communicate with their
voters. Coalition parties strategically use political communication to transmit their policy
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priorities to their voters and to justify why policy decisions have been made by the cabinet.
Accordingly, we observe that coalition parties talk about the same issues to their voters in the
middle of the legislative term when they focus on enacting a common legislative agenda. By
contrast at the beginning and the end of the legislative term in close proximity to elections,
coalition parties emphasize policy issues on which they have an advantage to reap electoral
gains.
In conclusion, this study constitutes an important first step in understanding how political
communication works in coalition governments. However, there are many questions that
remain unanswered. First, in future research, we hope to further open the black box of
coalition governments to better understand the dynamics of political communication. For
instance, are all coalition parties equally constrained by electoral competition or do junior
coalition partners have a much stronger need to differentiate from their coalition partner?
Second, in line with salience theory we could show that coalition parties selectively highlight
different sets of policy issues to distinguish themselves from their coalition partner. However,
what remains unanswered is whether coalition parties also have diverging positions on these
policy issues. Hence, future research should extend the presented analysis to also incorporate
the issue-specific policy positions of coalition parties to better understand intra-coalition
conflict. Third, while our study constitutes an important step in shedding light on the
dynamics of political communication in coalition governments, this study was limited to the
study of German coalition governments. Even though Germany shares many similarities with
other parliamentary systems, future research should extend the analysis to other institutional
settings to see how the coalition dynamics work in other countries. For instance, one may
argue that in countries where pre-electoral coalitions are the rule (Golder, 2006b,a), the
electoral incentive to differentiate is smaller than the coalition imperative to cooperate as
coalition parties have committed themselves to govern together for another term and therefore
strive to speak with one voice. In addition, another important source of variation across
countries is the frequency of early elections. The electoral cycle is not always exogenous
as previous intra-cabinet conflicts or strategic considerations might lead to early elections
(Lupia and Strøm, 1995; Kayser, 2005). While early elections in Germany are relatively
rare, the legislative term in other countries is frequently interrupted by snap elections. In
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such countries, we would expect that the effect of the electoral cycle on coalition party
differentiation is less pronounced than in Germany since cyclical effects are less likely
to evolve. Finally, another important avenue for future research is to shed light on the
relationship between media coverage and party agendas to explore how the media affects
what parties talk about.
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A Online Appendix
Examples of press releases
Press Release issued by the Greens
No: 0648/2000
Date: 27.10.2000
Decision of Bundestag on Civil Union in November
The spokesmen for legal policy Volker Beck (Greens) and Alfred Hartenbach (SPD)
declare:
The coalition strives to adopt the bill on Civil Union still in November. The final debate in
the Bundestag is scheduled for 10 November. With the introduction of the Civil Union, we
aim to reduce discrimination of same-sex couples. Gay and lesbian couples will for the first
time get a sold legal framework for their relationships by introducing the Civil Union as a
new legal instrument in German family law.
The red-green coalition therefore fulfills another important reform promise. The Civil Union
creates more justice. Homosexual partners were so far treated as strangers by German law
even if they have lived together and cared for another for decades. We will abolish this
injustice now.
We currently still negotiate with the rapporteurs of the other party groups. Additional
comments received in consultations of experts are moreover being integrated into the bill.
The final debate will be held in the Committee for Legal affairs on 8th of November.
The bill will be divided into two parts for the second and third reading in the Bundestag.
One bill for which the consent of the Bundesrat is required and one bill that can be approved
without its approval. Both bills will be put to vote on the 10th of November in the Bundestag
in second and third reading.
The bill that does not require the consent of the Bundesrat contains the regulations about the
Civil Union as a new legal instrument as well as all its implications for family and inheritance
law. A smaller number of legal implications will be regulated by the bill that requires
Bundesrat consent. We ask the CDU/CSU and FDP not to block these legal implications of
the Civil Union bill, but to engage in serious discussions to create reasonable solutions for
same-sex couples.
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Press Release issued by the CDU/CSU
No: 1218193
Date: 26.08.2008
Klaeden welcomes disclosure of nuclear programme of North Korea
Following the disclosure of the nuclear programme of North Korea today and the subsequent
abolition of US sanctions by US President Bush, the spokesman for foreign policy, Eckart
von Klaeden, declares:
The disclosure of the nuclear programme of North Korea was due for six months, but it is
nevertheless a step in the right direction towards full deconstruction of its nuclear programme.
It has to be emphasized that US President Bush has immeadiately reacted to this signal by
abolishing US sanctions against North Korea and by being ready to remove North Korea
from the list of terror states.
The leadership in Pyongyang has gone a first important step on the long way of returning
to the international community of states. This success would have not been possible without
the common efforts by the US and China.
The succesful termination of the second North Korea crisis is a lasting achievement of the
outgoing Bush administration and shows that the US are are willing to engage in multilateral
actions if these are promising and effective. We encourage China to continue this common
American-Chinese success by clearly adopting positions and taking actions agains Teheran.
It would thereby be possible that the progress in East Asia would have positive implications
for the conflict about the nuclear programme of Iran.
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Figure A.1: Diversity in issue attention over time
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Figure A.2: Issue attention over time
(a) Economy (b) Environment
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Table A.1: Composition of German governments from 2000 until 2010
Cabinet Start Election Parties Seats Cabinet posts
Schro¨der I 27.10.1998 27.09.1998 SPD 298 (44.5%) 13 (81.2%)
(SPD) Greens 47 (7.0%) 3 (18.8%)
Schro¨der II 22.10.2002 22.09.2005 SPD 251 (41.6%) 11 (78.6%)
(SPD) Greens 55 (9.1%) 3 (21.4%)
Merkel I 22.11.2005 18.09.2005 CDU 180 (29.3%) 5 (33.3%)
(CDU) CSU 46 (7.5%) 2 (12.5%)
SPD 222 (36.2%) 8 (53.3%)
Merkel II 28.10.2009 27.09.2009 CDU 194 (31.2%) 8 (50.0%)
(CDU) CSU 45 (7.2%) 3 (18.75%)
FDP 93 (15.0%) 5 (31.25%)
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Table A.2: Press releases by all analyzed parties
Year CDU/CSU FDP Greens SPD Total
2000 - 953 812 1,107 2,872
2001 1,919 974 702 970 4,565
2002 1,117 664 652 1,045 3,478
2003 1,426 752 831 893 3,902
2004 1,372 1,044 951 1,174 4,541
2005 1,401 641 1,281 1,166 4,489
2006 1,084 354 1,675 920 4,033
2007 1,039 524 1,406 735 3,704
2008 1,039 1,015 1,346 1,409 4,809
2009 896 650 1,052 1,164 3,762
2010 892 682 1,519 1,709 4,802
Total 12,185 8,253 12,227 12,292 44,957
33
Table A.3: Issue Areas and Bundestag Committees
Issue Area identified by text analysis Bundestag Committee
Perfectly matched
European Union Affairs of the European Union
Budget Budget
Culture/Media Cultural and Media Affairs
Defence Defence
Development aid Economic Cooperation and Development
Economy Economics and Technology
Education/Research Education, Research and Technology Assessment
Environment/Nuclear safety Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety
Finance Finance
Agriculture/Consumers/Food Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection
Health Health
Labour/Social Labour and Social Affairs
Legal affairs Legal Affairs
One committee, several issue areas
Family Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth
Equal opportunities Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth
Infrastructure/Transport Transport, Building and Urban Development
Municipalities Transport, Building and Urban Development
One issue area, several committees
Defence/Internal security Defence
Defence/Internal security Internal affairs
Energy Economy
Energy Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety
International Foreign Affairs
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid
Issue area without associated committee
La¨nder -
Committee without associated issue area
- Petitions
- Scrutiny of Elections
- Sports
- Tourism
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Table A.4: Time-series cross-section regression analysis
DV: Issue attention diversity (t0) Model 3 Model 4
Explanatory variables
Number of months until next national election 0.045 0.082
(0.054) (0.056)
Number of months until next national election (squared) -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Control variables
Pre-electoral conflict 0.010 0.010
(0.013) (0.013)
EP election -0.159 -0.031
(0.345) (0.347)
State election -0.080 -0.141
(0.115) (0.116)
Voter issue attention 0.012 0.012
(0.009) (0.009)
Unemployment -0.141*** -0.064
(0.038) (0.061)
BSE crisis 0.203 0.188
(0.211) (0.206)
CDU funding scandal 0.183 0.557
(0.398) (0.416)
9/11 Terror attacks 0.481 0.712*
(0.305) (0.313)
Afghanistan War -0.406 -0.448
(0.436) (0.425)
Flood . .
. .
Worldcup . .
. .
Economic crisis -0.398 0.035
(0.211) (0.281)
CDU/CSU-SPD coalition 0.289
(0.174)
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition -0.310
(0.372)
Issue attention diversity (t−1) 0.040 0.033
(0.041) (0.041)
Constant -2.986** -4.586***
N 646 646
R2 0.1382 0.1461
***p ≤ 0.01,**p ≤ 0.05,*p ≤ 0.10; Standard errors in parentheses; Issue area
fixed effects not reported
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Table A.5: Average length of Press Releases
Chancellor Role Party Average PR length (words)
Schro¨der I
In Coalition
SPD 60.974
GRUNEN 98.714
Opposition
CDU 88.762
FDP 83.116
Schro¨der II
In Coalition
SPD 76.734
GRUNEN 88.079
Opposition
CDU/CSU 110.997
FDP 54.484
Merkel I
In Coalition
CDU/CSU 107.012
SPD 112.54
Opposition
FDP 50.172
GRUNEN 86.077
Merkel II
In Coalition
CDU/CSU 107.122
FDP 59.700
Opposition
GRUNEN 79.860
SPD 81.623
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Table A.6: Aggregated Analysis explaining taxi cab distance
DV: Taxi Cab Distance Model 5
Explanatory variables
Number of months until next national election -0.013**
(0.005)
Number of months until next national election (squared) 0.0003***
(0.000)
Control variables
EP election 0.0478
(0.110)
State election -0.0658
(0.035)
Unemployment -0.0278
(0.016)
BSE crisis -0.0664
(0.093)
CDU funding scandal 0.0834
(0.068)
9/11 Terror attacks 0.2138
(0.116)
Afghanistan War -0.1905
(0.124)
Flood -0.0445
(0.158)
Worldcup -0.0041
(0.109)
Economic crisis -0.0333
(0.066)
CDU/CSU-SPD coalition 0.0340
(0.042)
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition -0.0465
(0.092)
Issue attention diversity (t-1) 0.0801
(0.055)
Constant 0.8689***
(0.197)
N 131
R2 0.2651
***p ≤ 0.01,**p ≤ 0.05,*p ≤ 0.10; Standard errors in parentheses
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Table A.7: Beta regression
DV: Issue attention diversity (t0) Model 6
Explanatory variables
Number of months until next national election -0.015***
(0.006)
Number of months until next national election (squared) 0.000***
(0.000)
Control variables
EP election 0.133
(0.130)
State election -0.081*
(0.043)
Voter issue attention 0.002**
(0.001)
Unemployment -0.065**
(0.019)
BSE crisis -0.060
(0.112)
CDU funding scandal 0.075
(0.081)
9/11 Terror attacks 0.254*
(0.131)
Afghanistan War -0.246*
(0.141)
Flood 0.103
(0.189)
Worldcup -0.123
(0.127)
Economic crisis -.150*
(0.079)
CDU/CSU-SPD coalition 0.113**
(0.049)
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition -0.047
(0.110)
Issue attention diversity (t-1) 1.520***
(0.251)
Constant -2.726***
(0.238)
Ln(phi) 3.488***
(0.031)
N 2374
***p ≤ 0.01,**p ≤ 0.05,*p ≤ 0.10; Standard errors in parentheses
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